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Abstract
In the face of seemingly intractable territorial and maritime disputes in the South
China Sea, the article examines how the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (LOSC), sets out what maritime claims States can make in the South China
Sea and how it establishes a framework that will enable States to either negotiate maritime boundary agreements or negotiate joint development arrangements (JDAs) in
areas of overlapping maritime claims. It provides an avenue whereby the maritime
claims of the claimants can be brought into line with international law, potentially
allowing for meaningful discussions on cooperation and maritime joint development
based on areas of overlapping maritime claims defined on the basis of the LOSC.

Keywords
South China Sea islands – EEZ maritime disputes – maritime claims – maritime
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Introduction
The South China Sea territorial and maritime disputes are commonly viewed as
“intractable” and joint development of maritime areas subject to overlapping
jurisdictional claims is often offered as a potential way forward. An enduring
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obstacle to the establishment of joint management mechanisms has, however,
been the question of precisely where such joint zones should be located. This
issue has been made especially problematic because of the lack of clarity in the
maritime claims of the parties. This article seeks to address this central, problematic issue and offers a potentially “game-changing” route towards a clearer
definition of the areas of overlapping claims—something that has the potential to contribute substantially to de-escalating these disputes and is an essential precursor to the realisation of maritime joint development in the South
China Sea.1 This article examines how the 1982 United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (LOSC)2 sets out what maritime claims States can make in
the South China Sea and how it establishes a framework that will enable States
to either negotiate maritime boundary agreements or negotiate joint development arrangements (JDAs) in areas of overlapping maritime claims.
The analysis is based on the view that the States claiming sovereignty
over the islands in the South China Sea (the Claimants) will not be able to
resolve the territorial sovereignty disputes through negotiations for the foreseeable future. It is also considered that they will not be willing to give their
consent to refer the sovereignty disputes to an international court or arbitral
tribunal and ask that court or tribunal to determine which State has the better
claim to sovereignty. Consequently, we have not attempted to analyse the merits of the sovereignty claims to the disputed islands. Nor have we attempted
to analyse the legal issues in a wider geopolitical context. The proposals made
here offer avenues whereby the maritime claims of the South China Sea
Claimants can be brought into conformity with the LOSC. It is recognised that
for this to be achieved, political will on the part of the Claimants is essential.
We are, however, firmly of the view that the parties to the South China Sea
disputes have shared interests in relations that are grounded on trust, mutual
respect, cooperation and the rule of international law. Moreover, we believe
that the changes that we advocate can be effected at relatively limited cost
but potentially substantial benefits to all of the South China Sea littoral States.
This article is organised as follows. First, the sovereignty and maritime claims
in the South China Sea are summarised. Second, the prospect of identifying
1 The authors would like to thank Ms. Youna Lyons, Senior Research Fellow at the NUS Centre
for International Law, for her assistance in identifying and classifying the features in the
Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands. The authors are also indebted to I Made Andi Arsana
of the Dept. of Geodetic and Geomatic Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, Gadjah Mada
University, Indonesia, for his assistance in the preparation of the maps accompanying this
article.
2 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) (Montego Bay, 10 December 1982,
in force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 397.

The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 29 (2014) 193–243

defining eez claims from islands

195

the areas of overlapping maritime claims and negotiating JDAs in the areas
surrounding the Spratly Islands is examined. Third, an analysis of issues and
opportunities related to specific sectors of the South China Sea is provided.
Finally, some general conclusions are drawn on the role of the LOSC in defining
the areas of overlapping claims in the South China Sea.
Maritime Claims in the South China Sea
Sovereignty Claims to Offshore Geographic Features
The fundamental legal dispute in the South China Sea is about which State has
the better claim to sovereignty over the disputed offshore islands. The LOSC
has no provisions on how to determine competing claims to sovereignty over
islands or other land territory. That issue is governed by the rules and principles of customary international law on the acquisition and loss of territory.3
The LOSC provides a broad framework with respect to international law of
the sea issues. Of particular relevance to the present discussion, the LOSC
sets out the freedoms, rights and obligations of States on the high seas and
in the various maritime zones measured from land territory and islands. The
LOSC assumes that sovereignty over the land territory and islands has been
established. Therefore, the LOSC is of no assistance in resolving the territorial
sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea. Determining which coastal State
(or States) has (or have) sovereignty over the disputed islands of the South
China Sea is, however, directly relevant to claims to maritime jurisdiction in
keeping with the long-standing legal maxim that “the land dominates the sea”.4
China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam have sovereignty
claims to some or all of the islands in the Spratly Islands5 and Brunei may
also claim sovereignty over one reef in the Spratly Islands. China, Taiwan
3 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th ed., Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 2012) 215–244.
4 This point was emphasised by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its first case concerning jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea, the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Germany v.
Netherlands, Germany v. Denmark) (1969) I.C.J. Reports 3, especially para. 19.
5 The Chinese name for the group of islands known as the Spratlys is Nansha and the
Vietnamese name is Trường Sa. There are multiple names in Chinese, Vietnamese, Filipino
and Malay for most of the individual features in the Spratlys. For the sake of simplicity and
consistency, we have used only the English language versions. For a list of the names of
the features in the Spratly Islands in the various languages, see the Gazetteer to the map
published by the US State Department in 2010. It is available on the CIL web site at http://cil.
nus.edu.sg/wp/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/75967_gazetteer.pdf; accessed 5 April 2014.
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and Vietnam also claim sovereignty over the Paracel Islands.6 None of the
Claimants have clarified which geographic features they claim are islands as
defined in Article 121 of the LOSC and subject to appropriation. Nor have they
issued charts or geographic coordinates of any straight baselines relating to the
islands from which they measure the territorial sea as required by Article 16 of
the LOSC. Where normal baselines apply to these islands, the Claimants have
likewise not publicised charts illustrating the location of the low-water line
they officially recognise in accordance with Article 5 of the LOSC. They also
have not clarified which geographic features are low-tide elevations that can
be used as basepoints because they are wholly or partially within 12 nautical
miles (nm) of an island.7
China has defined straight baselines around the Paracel Islands, but these
baselines are not consistent with the LOSC and have excited international
protests.8 Although at first glance these baselines have the appearance of being
archipelagic baselines, under the LOSC only ‘archipelagic States’ are permitted
to draw such baselines around mid-ocean archipelagos.9
There is also uncertainty regarding the current status of an historic claim
of the Philippines to an excessive claim to a territorial sea. The long-standing
position of the Philippines was that its “international treaty limits” were established under three international treaties, namely the 1898 Treaty of Paris,10 the
6

7

8

9
10

The Chinese name for the Paracel Islands is Xisha and the Vietnamese name is Hoàng Sa,
and there are also names for the individual islands in English, Chinese and Vietnamese.
For the sake of simplicity and consistency, we have used only the English language
versions. For a list of the names of the features in the Paracel Islands in the various
languages, see the Gazetteer to the map published by the US State Department in 2010.
Ibid.
This is permitted under Art. 13(2) of the LOSC. It is recognised that “M” is the technically
correct abbreviation for nautical miles. However, “nm” is frequently used in the literature
and will be employed as the abbreviation for nautical miles in this article.
Declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Baselines of
the Territorial Sea of the People’s Republic China, 15 May 1996, available at http://www.
un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/DEPOSIT/chn_mzn7_1996.
pdf; J. Ashley Roach and Robert Smith, Excessive Maritime Claims (3rd ed., Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2012) 98; See also, United States Department of State, Bureau
of Oceans and Environmental and Scientific Affairs, ‘Limits in the Sea No. 117—Straight
Baseline Claim: China’, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/57692.
pdf; accessed 5 April 2014.
China is not an “archipelagic State”; see LOSC Arts. 46 and 47(1).
The Treaty of Paris between Spain and the United States, signed at Paris, 10 December
1898, TS No. 343.
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Cession Treaty of 190011 and the 1930 Treaty of Washington.12 Under Section 1
of the 1935 Philippines Constitution, the territory of Philippines is described
as consisting of the territory established by these treaties, with all waters from
the baselines of the Philippines to the so-called “international treaty limits”
being considered as the territorial sea of the Philippines.13 Consequently, at
the furthest extent of the “box” formed by the treaty limits outlined above, the
Philippines claimed territorial sea rights extending 285 nm from the straight
baselines it claimed in the 1960s.14 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the international
community, including the United States as a party to the 1898 Treaty of Paris,
did not accept the position of the Philippines on the status of the waters inside
the rectangular box established by the treaties.15 In response to an objection by
Australia, the Philippines submitted a statement to the UN Secretary-General,
dated 26 October 1988, that it would harmonise its domestic legislation with the
LOSC.16 This harmonisation took more than 20 years. In 2009, the Philippines
passed a new baselines law which brought its claim into conformity with the
LOSC.17 As a result, the Philippines seems in practice to be bringing its maritime claims into strict conformity with the provisions of the LOSC. However, it
has still not amended its Constitution or formally abandoned its historic maritime claim.
11
12
13

14

15
16
17

The Treaty between Spain and the United States for the Cession of Outlying Islands for
the Philippines, signed at Washington, 7 November 1900, TS No. 345.
Convention between the United States and Great Britain Delimiting the Philippine
Archipelago and the State of Borneo, signed at Washington, 2 January 1930, TS No. 856.
Republic Act No. 3046 of 17 June 1961. An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of
the Philippines, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/
PDFFILES/PHL_1961_Act.pdf; accessed 5 April 2014.
See ibid. Republic Act No. 3046 of 17 June 1961, subsequently amended them through
Republic Act No. 5446 of 18 September 1968. An Act to Amend Section One of the
Republic Act Numbered Thirty Hundred and Forty-Six, Entitled “An Act to Define the
Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines”, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/
los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/PHL_1968_Act.pdf; accessed 5 April 2014;
See also Victor Prescott and Clive Schofield, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 2005) 452.
Roach and Smith (n 8), at 146–148.
Ibid., at p. 222.
Republic Act No. 9522: An Act to Amend Certain Provisions of Republic Act No. 3046,
as Amended by Republic Act No. 5446, to Define the Archipelagic Baselines of the
Philippines, and for Other Purposes Approved by the President on 10 March 2009 (2009)
70 Law of the Sea Bulletin 32–35.
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Maritime Claims from Mainland Territory
All of the States bordering the South China Sea claim an exclusive economic
zone (EEZ) measured from the baselines along their mainland coasts, or in
the case of the Philippines and Indonesia, from archipelagic baselines.18 It is
generally agreed that the archipelagic baselines employed by Indonesia and
the Philippines around their main archipelago are consistent with the LOSC
(see Fig. 1).19
Although some of the straight baselines used by China, Malaysia, Taiwan
and Vietnam may be of questionable legality,20 and may have a substantial
impact on the areas subject to the regimes of internal waters and territorial
sea, they will have only moderate impact on the outer limit of the 200-nm EEZ
claims measured from those baselines. For example, the islands that Vietnam’s
straight baselines link can generate maritime claims in their own right. This
means that the expansion of the potential scope of Vietnam’s EEZ is increased
to a far more limited extent than might otherwise be presumed (see Fig. 2).
18

19
20

Brunei Darussalam—Territorial Waters of Brunei Act, 1982. Indonesia—Law No. 1/1973
Concerning Continental Shelf (6 January 1973); Law No. 5/1983 on the Indonesian
Exclusive Economic Zone (18 October 1983); Law No. 6/1996 regarding Indonesian
Water (8 August 1996); Government Regulations No. 38/2002 on the Geographical List of
Coordinates of the Indonesian Archipelagic Baselines (28 June 2002) and Government
Regulations No. 37/2008 amending Regulations No. 38/2002 (19 May 2008). Malaysia—
Exclusive Economic Zone Act, 1984; Act No. 311 An Act Pertaining to the Exclusive
Economic Zone and Certain Aspects of the Continental Shelf of Malaysia and to
Provide for the Regulations of Activities in the Zone and on the Continental Shelf and
for Matters Connected Therewith, the Baselines of Maritime Zones Act 2006—Act 660
(29 December 2006) and the Territorial Sea Act 2012—Act 750 (18 June 2012). People’s
Republic of China—Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of 25 February
1992; Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Act, 26 June 1998. Philippines—
Presidential Decree No. 1599 of 11 June 1978 Establishing an Exclusive Economic Zone and
for other Purposes; Republic Act No. 9522 (n 17). Vietnam—Statement on the Territorial
Sea, the Contiguous Zone, the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of 12
May 1977; Statement on the Territorial Sea Baseline of 12 November 1982, all available at the
United Nations, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (UNDOALOS) National
Legislation Database—Asian and South Pacific States: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/
LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/asia.htm; Vietnam—The Law of the Sea of Viet Nam, 21
June 2012, Art. 15, available at http://vietnamnews.vn/politics-laws/228456/the-law-ofthe-sea-of-viet-nam.html; Republic of China—Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone, 21 January 1998; Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf,
21 January 1998, available at http://www.moi.gov.tw/english/english_law/law.aspx?
pages=12; accessed 5 April 2014.
Roach and Smith (n 8), at pp. 209 and 213.
Ibid., at pp. 76–82.
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Baselines and maritime claims in the South China Sea
Source: Adapted from a map included in the January 2013 issue of the
American Journal of International Law prepared by Clive Schofield and
Andi Arsana of the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and
Security (ANCORS), University of Wollongong, Australia.

Therefore, the questionable use of straight baselines, while an important issue
of concern, especially with respect to potential implications for freedom of
navigation, is relatively unimportant with respect to identifying areas of overlapping maritime claims in the central part of the South China Sea.
The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 29 (2014) 193–243
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figure 2

The impact of Vietnam’s claimed straight baselines on its maritime claims21

None of the States bordering the South China Sea have issued official charts
or lists of geographic coordinates showing the outer limit lines of their EEZ
claims as required by Article 75 of the LOSC. However, the outer limits of the
EEZ claims of Malaysia and Vietnam are shown on the maps contained in
their submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
(CLCS).22 Brunei, China, the Philippines and Taiwan have not issued charts or
21

22

Adapted from Fig. 2.11 in Clive Schofield, ‘Defining the “Boundary” between Land and
Sea: Territorial Sea Baselines in the South China Sea’, in S. Jayakumar, Tommy Koh and
Robert Beckman (eds), The South China Sea Disputes and Law of the Sea (Edward Elgar
Publishing, UK, forthcoming, 2014).
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) Outer Limits of the Continental
Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Baselines: Submissions to the Commission:
Joint Submission by Malaysia and Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, Executive Summary
(6 May 2009), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/
submission_mysvnm_33_2009.htm; accessed 5 April 2014.
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coordinates indicating the outer limit of their EEZ claims. It is interesting that
the Joint Submission of Malaysia and Vietnam shows a 200-nm EEZ limit for
the Philippines.23
Several of the States bordering the South China Sea are adjacent to each
other and agreements will be required to clarify their adjacent EEZ boundaries.
Brunei seems to have settled its adjacent boundaries with Malaysia through an
exchange of letters,24 and China and Vietnam have reached a partial boundary
agreement in the Gulf of Tonkin.25 Additionally, Indonesia has delimited its
continental shelf boundaries in the south-western part of the South China Sea
with both Malaysia and Vietnam (see Fig. 1).26 The adjacent boundary between
Malaysia and the Philippines is an especially difficult problem because of the
historic sovereignty claim of the Philippines to the Malaysian State of Sabah.27
In May 2009, Malaysia and Vietnam made a Joint Submission to the CLCS
claiming a continental shelf beyond 200 nm.28 Vietnam made a separate
submission for an extended continental shelf further to the north, opposite
23
24

25

26

27

28

Ibid.
Brunei Darussalam’s Preliminary Submission concerning the Outer Limits of its
Continental Shelf, 12 May 2009, para. 10, available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/
clcs_new/submissions_files/preliminary/brn2009preliminaryinformation.pdf; accessed
5 April 2014.
Agreement between the People’s Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of
Viet Nam on the Delimitation of the Territorial Seas, Exclusive Economic Zones and
Continental Shelves of the Two Countries in Beibu Bay/Bac Bo Gulf (with maps) (Beijing,
25 December 2000, in force 30 June 2004), 2336 UNTS 179.
Indonesia and Malaysia signed an agreement related to seabed boundary delimitation
in the Strait of Malacca and South China Sea, on 27 October 1969. See Choon-ho Park,
‘Indonesia-Malaysia (Continental Shelf)’ in Jonathan I. Charney and Lewis M. Alexander
(eds), International Maritime Boundaries (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston,
1993) 1025–1027. The terminal points of the two lateral seabed boundary segments defined
by Indonesia and Malaysia in the south-western South China Sea were subsequently
connected to each other through a continental shelf boundary line agreed between
Indonesia and Vietnam which was signed on 26 June 2003. See Agreement between the
Government of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the Government of the Republic
of Indonesia concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf boundary (26 June
2003, in force 29 May 2007), in David A. Colson and Robert W. Smith (eds), International
Maritime Boundaries (Volume VI, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2011), 4,301–4,315.
Official Gazette, No. 2587 Appendix XVI, Republic of the Philippines Department of
Foreign Affairs, 2 February 1966, available at http://www.gov.ph/1966/02/07/philippineclaim-to-north-borneo-sabah-vol-ii-appendix-xvi/; accessed 5 April 2014.
CLCS, Joint Submission by Malaysia and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam (n 22).
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the Philippines.29 Brunei, China and the Philippines have either made
partial submissions or submitted preliminary information indicating that they
also intend to make submissions claiming an extended continental shelf in
the South China Sea.30 China and the Philippines have objected to the Joint
Submission of Malaysia and Vietnam, as well as to the separate submission
of Vietnam.31
If Brunei, China and the Philippines make extended continental shelf claims
in the South China Sea, they are likely to overlap with the claims of Malaysia
and Vietnam. In addition, Malaysia and Vietnam are likely to object to their
claims. Therefore, even if no maritime zones (such as the EEZ and continental
shelf) are claimed from the disputed offshore islands, there will be substantial areas of overlapping continental shelf claims between opposite States and
adjacent States in the South China Sea.
EEZ and Continental Shelf Claims from Offshore Geographic
Features
The offshore geographic features in the South China Sea that meet the definition of an island in Article 121(1) are entitled in principle to an EEZ and continental shelf of their own.32 However, Article 121(3) provides that if they are
rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own,
29

30

31

32

CLCS Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Baselines:
Submission to the Commission: Submission by the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam,
Executive Summary (7 May 2009), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/
submissions_files/submission_vnm_37_2009.htm; accessed 5 April 2014.
Brunei Darussalam’s Preliminary Submission (n 24); Preliminary Information Indicative
of the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles of the People’s
Republic of China, 11 May 2009, available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/
submissions_files/preliminary/chn2009preliminaryinformation_english.pdf; CLCS Outer
Limits of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Baselines: Submissions
to the Commission: Submission by the Republic of the Philippines, 19 July 2012, available
at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_phl_22_2009.
htm; CLCS Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the
Baselines: Submissions to the Commission: Submission by the People’s Republic of China,
14 December 2012, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/
submission_chn_63_2012.htm; accessed 6 April 2014.
Communications Received with regard to the Joint Submission made by Malaysia and
Viet Nam to the CLCS (n 22), China (7 May 2009 and 14 April 2011) and the Philippines
(4 August 2009 and 5 April 2011); Communications Received with regard to the Submission
made by Viet Nam to the CLCS (n 29), China (7 May 2009 and 14 April 2011) and the
Philippines (4 August 2009 and 5 April 2011).
LOSC Art. 121(2).
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they are not entitled to an EEZ and continental shelf. If it is not a rock within
the meaning of Article 121(3), an island is automatically entitled to a continental shelf. If a State intends to claim an EEZ from an island or from other
land territory, it must make a formal claim. As a practical matter, the simplest
option would be for a Claimant to claim an EEZ from an island, as that would
give it sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting the natural
resources of both the seabed and subsoil and the superjacent waters.33
For example, under its national legislation China claims an EEZ from
the Paracel Islands,34 but it has not clarified the outer limits of its EEZ claim.
China has stated that the Spratly Islands are entitled to an EEZ and continental
shelf,35 but it has not indicated the baselines from which its maritime zones
are measured or the outer limit of its EEZ or continental shelf claim from the
Spratlys.
Indeed, none of the other Claimants have indicated whether they are claiming an EEZ or continental shelf from any of the islands in the Spratly Islands,
and Vietnam has not indicated whether it is claiming an EEZ or continental
shelf from the Paracel Islands. The fact that Malaysia and Vietnam included
EEZ claims only from their respective mainland coasts in their submissions
to the CLCS implies that they are not intending to claim an EEZ or continental shelf from any of the disputed islands over which they claim sovereignty.
However, they would arguably not be precluded from claiming an EEZ from
the islands at some point in the future if they decide that it is in their interests
to do so. If EEZ and/or continental shelf claims are made from any of the disputed islands, they will overlap substantially with the EEZ claims and extended
continental claims from the mainland territory and archipelagic baselines of
the States bordering the South China Sea.
Historic Title or Historic Rights inside the Nine-Dashed Line
When China attached its nine-dashed line map to its Note Verbale of 6 May
2009 to the UN Secretary-General, questions arose as to the significance of the
map to China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea. The Note Verbale states
that “China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China
Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over
33
34
35

LOSC Art. 56(1).
China—Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (n 18), Art. 2; Exclusive
Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Act (n 18), Art. 2.
Communications Received with regard to the Joint Submission made by MalaysiaViet Nam (n 22), China (14 April 2011); Communications Received with regard to the
Submission made by Viet Nam (n 29), China (14 April 2011).
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the relevant waters (see attached map)”.36 Under the LOSC, a State has sovereignty over islands and the 12-nm territorial sea adjacent to them. It also has
sovereign rights and jurisdiction to explore and exploit the natural resources
in the EEZ measured from the islands and to any continental shelf claimed
from the islands. Therefore, if the term ‘adjacent waters’ is meant to signify
areas of territorial sea while the phrase ‘relevant waters’ is intended to refer to
an EEZ claimed from the islands, China’s statement as to its claims would be
consistent with the LOSC.
The question has arisen as to whether China is claiming rights and jurisdiction only in the EEZ measured from the islands or whether it is claiming rights
and jurisdiction in all the waters inside the nine-dashed line. With respect to
jurisdiction, some national legislation of China states that it applies not only in
China’s maritime zones, but also in all other sea areas under the jurisdiction of
the PRC.37 Some commentators have suggested that the “other sea areas under

36

37

Communications Received with regard to the Joint Submission made by Malaysia-Viet
Nam (n 22), China (7 May 2009); Communications Received with regard to the Submission
made by Viet Nam (n 29), China (7 May 2009).
Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Control over Dumping Wastes
into the Sea Waters, 6 March 1985, Art. 3: “The present Regulations shall apply to (1) The
dumping of wastes or other matter into the internal sea and the territorial sea, onto
the continental shelf and into other sea areas under the jurisdiction of the People’s
Republic of China; . . . (3) The shipping of wastes or other matter in the internal sea,
territorial sea and other sea areas under the jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China
for the purpose of dumping.” Available at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/
rotprocotcodwitsw934/; Marine Environment Protection Law of the People’s Republic of
China, 25 December 1999, Art. 2: “This law shall apply to the internal waters, territorial
seas and the contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones and continental shelves
of the People’s Republic of China and all other sea areas under the jurisdiction of the
People’s Republic of China.” Available at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/
meplotproc607/; Fisheries Law of the People’s Republic of China, Art. 2: “All productive
activities of fisheries, . . . in the inland waters, tidal flats, territorial waters and exclusive
economic zones of the People’s Republic of China and in all other sea areas under the
jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China shall be conducted in accordance with this
Law.” Available at http://www.china.org.cn/china/LegislationsForm2001-2010/2011-02/14/
content_21917138.htm; Surveying and Mapping Law of the People’s Republic of China,
29 August 2002, Art 2: “All surveying and mapping activities conducted in the domain
of People’s Republic of China and other sea areas under the jurisdiction of the People’s
Republic of China shall comply with this Law.” Available at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/
legis/cen/laws/samlotproc506/; accessed 6 April 2014.
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the jurisdiction of the PRC” could refer to the all of the sea areas inside the
nine-dashed line.38
China issued a second Note Verbale on 11 April 2011. Some writers have argued
that the language used in this second Note Verbale suggests that China is also
claiming historic rights to resources in all the areas inside the nine-dashed
line.39 However, the Note Verbale does not use the phrase ‘historic rights’. Also,
there appears to be no other official statement from the Chinese Government
claiming that it has historic rights in the waters inside the nine-dashed line.
The only reference to historic rights in any official document is that in Article
14 of China’s national legislation on the EEZ, which states that “[t]he provisions of this Act shall not affect the historical rights of the People’s Republic
of China”.40 However, that Act gives no indication as to where China may have
historical rights.
Nevertheless, some commentators from China and Taiwan have asserted
that China claims historic rights and jurisdiction in the waters inside the ninedashed line.41 Some academics have opined that in practice China has been
asserting not only historic rights to fish in the waters inside the nine-dashed
line, but also historic rights to other maritime activities, including the right to
explore and exploit oil and gas resources.42
The Philippines and Vietnam have taken the position that under the LOSC,
States can only claim sovereign rights to explore and exploit natural resources
in and under the water if they claim maritime zones from land territory,
including islands.43 They do not recognise the legitimacy of any other claim to
historic rights to resources in and under the waters inside the nine-dashed line.
38

39

40
41

42
43

Nong Hong, ‘Interpreting the U-Shape Line in the South China Sea’, 15 May 2012, available
at http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/interpreting-the-u-shape-line-in-thesouth-china-sea/; accessed 6 April 2014.
Zhiguo Gao and Bingbing Jia, ‘The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status,
and Implications’ (2013) 107(1) The American Journal of International Law (AJIL) 98–124, at
p. 108.
China—Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Act (n 18), Art. 14.
Yann-Huei Song, United States and Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: A Study of
Ocean Law and Politics (School of Law of the University of Maryland, Baltimore, 2001) 73.
Keyuan Zou, ‘Historic Rights in International Law and in China’s Practice’ (2001) 32(2)
Ocean Development and International Law (ODIL) 149–168, at pp. 160–163; Gao and Jia
(n 39), at pp. 123–124.
Hong (n 38); Gao and Jia (n 39), at pp. 108 and 124; Keyuan Zou, ‘China’s U-Shaped Line in
the South China Sea Revisited’ (2012) 43(1) ODIL 18–34, at p. 22.
See, for example, Republic of the Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs Manila,
SFA Statement on the UNCLOS Arbitral Proceedings against China, 22 January 2013,
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They presumably take a similar position with respect to the assertion of claims
to jurisdiction over activities in the waters inside the nine-dashed line that are
not consistent with the jurisdiction of coastal States in the EEZ as provided in
Article 56 of the LOSC.
It can be argued that the decision in the Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration supports
the view that historic fishing rights of a third State in waters under the jurisdiction of a coastal State were not necessarily extinguished by the LOSC and continue to be governed by customary international law.44 However, it is unlikely
that the ASEAN Claimants would recognise China’s claim to historic fishing
rights within the areas they consider to be part of their EEZs. They would in
all probability maintain that they have sovereign rights to exploit the living
resources in their EEZ, and that they need only to take into account “the need
to minimise economic dislocation in States whose nationals have habitually
fished in the zone” when granting access to any surplus in their EEZ.45
Furthermore, Clive Symmons maintains that a claim to historic rights must
meet the same general requirements as a claim to historic waters. That is, there
must have been a formal claim, a continuous and effective exercise of the rights
being claimed, and international acquiescence in the claim.46 It would be very
difficult for China to prove that these requirements have been met in the South
China Sea, as it would need to show that it formally claimed historic fishing
rights in the EEZ of the other Claimants and that those States acquiesced in
China’s claim. It would be even more difficult for China to assert historic rights
to explore and exploit for hydrocarbon resources in the EEZs of other States.
China’s claim to historic rights in all the waters inside the nine-dashed line
could possibly be considered and ruled upon in the pending arbitration case
between the Philippines and China.47 Otherwise, the only other prospect for
resolving this issue would be for the Claimants to enter into JDAs which spell
out the right of the Claimants, including China, to exercise rights to resources
in the areas subject to the JDAs. Such JDAs might be possible if they sidestep

44
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Notification and Statement of Claim on West Philippine Sea, available at https://www.
dfa.gov.ph/index.php/2013-06-27-21-50-36/unclos; accessed 6 April 2014.
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA): Eritrea v. Yemen, Award of the Arbitral Tribunal
in the Second Stage of the Proceedings—Maritime Delimitation (17 December 1999), at
paras 109–11; available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1160; accessed
6 April 2014.
LOSC Art. 62(3).
Clive R. Symmons, Historic Waters in the Law of the Sea: A Modern Re-Appraisal (Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 2008) 111–245.
PCA: The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China, available at http://
www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1529; accessed 6 April 2014.

The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 29 (2014) 193–243

defining eez claims from islands

207

the difficult legal issues by not specifically mentioning either the nine-dashed
line or the historic rights of China.
Potential Impact of the Philippines v. China Arbitration
The Arbitral Tribunal in the Philippines v. China case48 will decide whether it
has jurisdiction to hear the case, notwithstanding the declaration of China
under Article 298 excluding disputes concerning the interpretation or application of Articles 15, 74 and 83 of the LOSC relating to sea boundary delimitations, or disputes involving historic bays or titles.49 If it does decide that it
has jurisdiction, the Arbitral Tribunal could rule on several issues that would
clarify how LOSC provisions apply to the complex legal disputes in the South
China Sea.
First, the Arbitral Tribunal may rule on the Philippines’ assertion that claims
to rights and jurisdiction in maritime space can only be made from land territory, including islands. In the course of doing so, it may also confirm that
reefs or rocks that are totally submerged are part of the seabed and cannot be
subject to appropriation.
Second, the Arbitral Tribunal may also consider whether China has rights
and jurisdiction in the waters surrounding disputed islands within the EEZ of
the Philippines. In the course of addressing this issue, the Arbitral Tribunal
may consider the issue of whether China has historic rights in such areas, even
though historic rights are governed by customary international law rather than
the LOSC. Article 321 of the LOSC provides that a tribunal having jurisdiction
under section 2 of Part XV shall apply the LOSC and “other rules of international law” compatible with the LOSC. Thus, even though the topic of historic
rights is governed for the most part by customary international law rather than
by the LOSC, the Arbitral Tribunal could decide how the concept of historic
rights relates to the LOSC, and under what circumstances historic fishing rights
in the EEZ of another State must be recognised or taken into account.
Third, the Arbitral Tribunal may decide whether the islands occupied by
China are rocks under Article 121(3) that are not entitled to an EEZ and continental shelf of their own. In the course of deciding this question, it could also
provide valuable guidance on whether any of the larger islands in the South
China Sea would in principle be entitled to an EEZ and continental shelf of
their own.
48
49

Philippines—Notification and Statement of Claims on West Philippine Sea (n 43).
China—Declaration made after Ratification (25 August 2006), available at http://www.
un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm#China Upon rat‑
ification; accessed 6 April 2014.
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Fourth, the Arbitral Tribunal may address the legal issues relating to the
occupation of low-tide elevations, including rights and jurisdiction in the
waters surrounding them.
Although attempting to discern the possible or likely outcomes of the
Arbitral Tribunal’s deliberations would inevitably be highly speculative, if
some or all of these issues are addressed, the Arbitral Tribunal could clarify
some of the complex legal issues that are relevant to resolving the maritime
disputes in the South China Sea. However, any award of the Arbitral Tribunal
will not address the two most fundamental legal issues which underlie the
disputes in the South China Sea. First, the Arbitral Tribunal cannot consider
which State has the better claim to sovereignty over any of the disputed
islands because it can only consider disputes concerning the interpretation
or application of the LOSC, and there are no provisions in the LOSC on how
to decide issues of sovereignty. Second, the Arbitral Tribunal cannot decide
how to delimit any EEZ boundaries between China and its neighbours, including the EEZ boundary between the main archipelago of the Philippines and
the disputed offshore islands. This is because the declaration made by China
under Article 298 excludes the disputes on the interpretation or application of
Article 74 concerning the delimitation of overlapping EEZ boundaries.
Clarifying Areas of Overlapping Maritime Claims around the
Spratly Islands
Maritime Claims from the Spratly Islands
None of the ASEAN Claimants have clarified whether they are claiming an EEZ
from any of the Spratly Islands over which they claim sovereignty. This is not
surprising, as it is arguably in their interests to maintain that all of the islands
in the Spratlys are rocks within Article 121(3) that have no entitlement to an
EEZ and continental shelf of their own. This would serve to limit the “areas
in dispute” in the waters surrounding the Spratly Islands to the 12-nm belt of
territorial sea around those features which meet the definition of an island,
that is, the naturally formed areas of land surrounded by and above water at
high tide.50 The result would be that the areas of overlapping claims associated
with the islands would be limited to the 12-nm territorial sea surrounding the
disputed islands. From the perspective of the ASEAN Claimants, this would be
advantageous as it would leave them free to pursue marine resource development activities in offshore areas proximate to their coasts in the South China
50

LOSC Art. 121(1).
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Sea. However, Claimants would still need to delimit their adjacent maritime
boundaries. This scenario would leave a substantial high seas “pocket” in the
central part of the South China Sea located beyond 200 nm from the surrounding mainland and main island coasts (see Figs. 1 and 8).
From its Notes Verbales of 7 May 2009 and 11 April 2011, it seems that China is
making two types of claims to maritime space in the South China Sea.51 First,
it claims ‘sovereignty’ over the islands (and perhaps over other geographic features) in the four archipelagos in the South China Sea, as well as to the ‘waters
adjacent to the islands’, which most likely refers to the 12-nm territorial seas
adjacent to the islands. Second, it claims ‘sovereign rights and jurisdiction’ over
the ‘relevant waters’ as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof. Given that the
statement of 11 April 2011 also asserts that the Spratly Islands are fully entitled
to a territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf, we can probably assume that
China is claiming sovereign rights and jurisdiction to the natural resources in
the EEZ (and continental shelf) measured from the islands.
As noted above, if the reference to ‘adjacent waters’ is read to refer to the
territorial sea and the reference to ‘relevant waters’ is read to refer to the EEZ,
China’s claims would be consistent with the LOSC and international law.
However, China has not indicated which of the islands it believes are entitled
to an EEZ, and it has not amended its national legislation to declare baselines
around them, as it has for the Paracel Islands.52 Therefore, the extent of its EEZ
claim from the islands, and the area of overlapping claims, is uncertain.
A Game-Changing Option for China?
China could potentially trigger a paradigm shift in its disputes in the South
China Sea if it were to formally declare an EEZ from the largest islands in the
Spratly Islands.53 To make its EEZ claim clear, China could identify which
islands in the Spratlys it believes are in principle entitled to an EEZ of their
own. It could define the baselines for these islands, taking into account the
provisions in the LOSC for baselines of islands on atolls and fringing reefs, as
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52
53

Communications Received with regard to the Joint Submission made by Malaysia-Viet
Nam (n 22), China (7 May 2009 and 14 April 2011); Communications Received with regard
to the Submission made by Viet Nam (n 29), China (7 May 2009 and 14 April 2011).
China—Declaration on the Baselines of the Territorial Sea (n 8).
For an appraisal of hydrographic issues relating to the South China Sea islands, see David
Hancox and Victor Prescott, ‘A Geographical Description of the Spratly Islands and an
Account of Hydrographic Surveys Amongst those Islands’ (1995) 1(6) International
Boundaries Research Unit (IBRU) Maritime Briefing 1–88.
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well as the existence of any low-tide elevations situated within 12 nm from
islands on the reefs.54
Since most of the islands in the Spratlys are very small and are located in
relatively close proximity to each other, China could limit its EEZ claim to the
largest islands and/or those which are vegetated, without having an overly
dramatic impact on the scope of its claims to maritime jurisdiction based on
claimed sovereignty over the disputed islands of the South China Sea. For purposes of illustration, we have identified what appear to be the 12 largest islands
based on past studies (see Fig. 3). They are all very small and the total land area
of the 12 islands is less than two square kilometres. Despite their limited size,
however, all 12 have vegetation and in some cases roads and structures have
been built on them.
When Article 121 of the LOSC was drafted, numerous proposals were made
regarding the tricky issue of distinguishing between islands capable of generating continental shelf and EEZ claims and mere “rocks” which cannot. Many
of these proposals focused on criteria related to size and the presence of vegetation and/or water sources.55 Ultimately, no consensus was reached then
and subsequently no definitive position has been determined through State
practice or by virtue of an authoritative ruling from an international judicial
body. Nonetheless, it is suggested that island size, coupled with the presence
of vegetation, are useful, if not necessarily definitive, indicators of islands that
may, in principle, be capable of generating continental shelf and EEZ rights.
Accordingly, it can be argued in good faith that the islands we have identified are not “rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life
of their own” within the meaning of Article 121(3). As a result, they would, in
principle, be entitled to a territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf of their
own. Furthermore, the largest features among the Paracel Islands group have
been identified and would similarly be entitled to generate EEZ and continental shelf rights in keeping with Article 121(2) of the LOSC (see below). Further,
Pratas Island can be viewed as being of an analogous character.
Of the 12 largest islands in the Spratlys, Taiwan occupies Itu Aba (Taiping
Island), the largest island and the only one reported to have a source of fresh
54
55

LOSC Arts. 6 and 13.
Such proposals were advanced, for example, by the delegations of Malta and Ireland
during the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). See S.N. Nandan and
S. Rosenne (eds) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary
(Volume III, Kluwer Law International, Dordrecht, 1995) 321–339. On the legislative
history of Article 121, see also UNDOALOS, Régime of Islands: Legislative History of Part VIII
(Article 121) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (United Nations, New
York, 1988).
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water. The Philippines currently occupies five features, all of which are located
within what it terms the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG): Northeast Cay, Thitu
Island, West York Island, Loaita Island and Nanshan Island. Vietnam occupies
the remaining six: Southwest Cay, Sand Cay, Namyit Island, Sin Cowe Island,
Amboyna Cay and Spratly Island. All of those islands occupied by Vietnam are
within the KIG, except for Spratly Island, which is located towards the southwestern fringes of the Spratly Islands group. Although China does not currently
occupy any of the 12 islands, as it claims sovereignty over all of them, it is likely
to take the view that it has a right to claim an EEZ from them.
If China were to claim an EEZ from these 12 islands, it should issue charts
indicating the geographic limits of its EEZ claim. In indicating the geographic
limits it could give full effect to the islands toward the open sea and draw an
equidistance or median line between the islands and the coasts of Brunei,
Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam.56 Even though the jurisprudence of
international courts and tribunals provides that the maritime zones from
small offshore islands should be given reduced effect or even ‘enclaved’ when
delimiting maritime boundaries between large mainland territory and a small
island, it is now well established that the starting point for courts and tribunals
is almost always the equidistance line.57 Since the equidistance line is the first
step in determining the boundary in the case of overlapping claims between
offshore islands and mainland territory, a claim to the equidistance line would
56

57

An equidistance line is a geometrically exact expression of the concept of a “midline”, consistently at an equal distance from opposing basepoints. In the technical law
of the sea literature, the term “median line” is sometimes used when referring to an
equidistance line between two opposite States and the term “equidistance line” is
used for an equidistance line between two adjacent States. However, as is observed in
the International Hydrographic Organization’s TALOS Manual, “In practice, however,
the concept of adjacent and opposition are often difficult to define and apply, but the
method used to determine an equidistance line is the same whatever the relationship
of the coasts of the States.” Consequently, the term ‘equidistance line’ is preferred in
this Chapter. See International Hydrographic Organization (with the Intergovernmental
Oceanographic Commission and the International Association of Geodesy), A Manual
on Technical Aspects of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea—1982, Special
Publication No.51, (4th ed., International Hydrographic Bureau, Monaco, 2006) (TALOS
Manual) Chapter 6, 3–4, available at http://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/gcil_iho_tech_
aspects_los.pdf; accessed 6 April 2014.
ICJ: Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), Judgment
of 3 June 1985 (1985) I.C.J. Reports 13; Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions
between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Merits, Judgment of 16 March 2001 (2001)
I.C.J. Reports 40; Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment of
19 November 2012 (2012) I.C.J. Reports 624.
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be a good faith claim that is consistent with the LOSC and international law.
Any claim to an EEZ from an island beyond the equidistance line could be
viewed as an abuse of right under Article 300 of the LOSC. At the same time,
China could make an EEZ claim from Pratas Island, which is currently occupied by Taiwan but also claimed by China, and from the Paracel Islands, which
are currently occupied by China but also claimed by Vietnam.
Fig. 3 is intended to demonstrate the effect of an EEZ claim from the 12 largest islands in the Spratlys, as well as from the largest islands in the Paracels and
from Pratas Island. It gives full effect to the islands in the direction of the open
sea, making most of the area in the middle of the South China Sea subject to
the EEZ regime rather than the high seas regime. The map also shows the theoretical equidistance line between the 12 islands in the Spratlys and the coasts of
Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. Moreover, the map illustrates
full effect lines into the central part of the South China Sea as well as theoretical equidistance lines for the largest of the features among the Paracel Islands
and for Pratas Island.58
For the purposes of this exercise, normal rather than claimed straight or
archipelagic baselines have been used for the surrounding mainland and main
island coastlines. This approach is consistent with past international judicial
practice which has tended to ignore claimed straight baselines when determining the basepoints from which to construct equidistance lines.59 The area
of overlapping claims would include a significant portion of the above-mentioned KIG claim area of the Philippines (illustrated on Fig. 1). It would also
include some areas where the Governments of some of the littoral States have
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The names of the islands in the Paracel Island group that we believe would be entitled
in principle to an EEZ and continental shelf of their own are annotated on Fig. 8 and
listed in the next section of this paper, together with an analysis of the practical effect
of such an EEZ claim. Note that Fig. 3 is designed to illustrate the location of the larger
islands in the Spratly and Paracel Islands. These are shown with shaded territorial sea
areas around them. Note also that there are numerous other smaller features in these
island groups that are entitled to generate territorial sea areas. These smaller features
are not illustrated on Fig. 3 in order to highlight the location of the larger islands used
to construct equidistance lines. See, however, Fig. 9. See also the Appendix to this paper,
which contains an explanatory note summarizing the rationale for the maritime zones
drawn from the islands illustrated in the figures accompanying this article.
It remains open to question how an international court or tribunal might treat archipelagic
baselines defined in accordance with Art. 47 of the LOSC when constructing equidistance
lines, as this issue has yet to arise before an international judicial body.
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granted concessions for the exploration of hydrocarbon resources.60 One notable impact of this approach is that a relatively small high seas pocket would
exist in the north-eastern part of the South China Sea (see Fig. 3).

figure 3

60

Theoretical equidistance lines and remaining high seas pocket generated from larger
islands in the South China Sea

For example, the Philippines, with respect to the Reed Bank area located to the north-east
of the Spratly Islands group, Malaysia and Brunei, concerning areas off their territories on
the Island of Borneo, and Vietnam, in relation to the Vanguard Bank to the south-west of
the Spratly Islands.
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There would be several advantages to China if it made such a claim. First,
its claim would be in conformity with the LOSC. Second, it would result in a
large area of overlapping EEZ claims that would be subject to the provisions in
Articles 74 and 83. The Claimants would be under an obligation to make every
effort to enter into “provisional arrangements of a practical nature” such as
JDAs.61 Furthermore, they would be under an obligation not to take any unilateral actions that would jeopardise or hamper the reaching of a final agreement
on the maritime boundaries.62 In short, this action would bring China’s maritime claims into line with both the LOSC and the claims made by the other
Claimant States. Consequently, all of the Claimants would be negotiating on
the same basis in international law and, in the authors’ view, this could result
in a de-escalation of the South China Sea disputes and arguably clear the way
for them to begin negotiations on the area of overlapping claims.
A further advantage to China if it followed this course of action is that the
ASEAN Claimants may not have the option of invoking the compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions in section 2 of Part XV of the LOSC on the
settlement of disputes. China’s declaration of 26 August 2006 excludes any disputes on the interpretation or application of Articles 74 and 83 from the compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions in section 2 of Part XV.63
As alluded to above, if China were to claim an EEZ from the largest 12
islands in the Spratlys, the Philippines or Vietnam may challenge the claim.
They could maintain that all of the islands in the Spratlys are rocks within
Article 121(3) and not entitled to an EEZ or continental shelf of their own.
This would be a very difficult argument to make, unless a very strict reading
of Article 121(3) were to be taken. Alternatively, the Philippines and Vietnam
could respond by also claiming an EEZ from some or all of the same islands if
they also claim sovereignty over them. If they were to make such a claim, they
are likely to argue that islands can be given full effect in the direction of the
open ocean, but that they should be given a substantially reduced or partial
effect in the direction of their mainland territory or main archipelago and even
“enclaved” or “semi-enclaved” (see Fig. 4). They could cite the jurisprudence
of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in support of their position on the

61
62
63

LOSC Arts. 74(3) and 83(3).
Ibid.
China—Declaration made after Ratification (n 49). The texts of the declarations of all
States Parties to the LOSC are available on the United Nations Treaties Database (Status as at
05 April 2014) at https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_
no=XXI~6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en; accessed 6 April 2014.
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latter point.64 The result would be negotiations between China and ASEAN
Claimants as to how to define the area of overlapping claims between the
islands and the coasts of the ASEAN countries.
If China claimed an EEZ from the largest islands, it would benefit the ASEAN
Claimants as well as China. The ASEAN Claimants would benefit because it
would be clear that, at the least, the waters on “their” side of the equidistance
line would not be areas of overlapping claims. Therefore, they would have
undisputed sovereign rights to explore and exploit the natural resources in
these areas.
Clarifying the Areas of Overlapping Maritime Claims
If China were to make an EEZ claim from the largest disputed islands as
described above, it would set the stage for negotiations to more precisely
define the areas of overlapping claims. In some areas between the islands and
the mainland coasts, the Claimants directly concerned may agree to follow the
jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals and give these small, isolated islands a reduced or partial effect, rather than full effect. The impact of
according the larger islands of the Paracel and Spratly Island groups half and
quarter effect is illustrated in Fig. 4.
In the areas of overlapping claims, the Claimants could then attempt to
negotiate JDAs and other cooperative arrangements as called for in the 2002
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.65 Such cooperative arrangements would be interim arrangements of a practical nature and
they would be without prejudice to the sovereignty disputes over the islands
or to a final agreement on the maritime boundaries.
If the Claimants were to enter into negotiations to cooperate in the areas of
overlapping claims, they could sidestep most of the difficult legal issues, such
as which State has the better claim to sovereignty over the islands, whether an
extended continental shelf claim from the mainland takes precedence over
or “trumps” an EEZ claim from an island, and whether a State has the right to
legally occupy a low-tide elevation.
If it took this approach, China would not need to formally abandon its ninedashed line map or even issue a formal clarification of the nine-dashed line.
64
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ICJ: Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta); Maritime
Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain);
Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia) (n 57).
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (Phnom Penh, 4 November
2002), available at http://www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/china/item/
declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea; accessed 6 April 2014.
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Partial effect for the larger Paracel and Spratly Islands

China could instead simply agree to begin negotiations on cooperative arrangements in the areas of overlapping claims resulting from its EEZ claims from
the disputed islands. The result would be that the ASEAN Claimants would,
in principle, have sovereign rights over those maritime areas off their coasts
up to the equidistance line with the largest disputed islands—something that
presently appears to be contested. China could, however, still take the position
that its “historic fishing rights” should be taken into account in any JDAs in the
areas of overlapping claims. In addition, China could request that the ASEAN
Claimants give access to its nationals to any surplus in the areas of their EEZ
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that are not subject to overlapping claims. The rationale for the latter request
is Article 62 of the LOSC, which provides that when giving access to any
surplus in their EEZ, coastal States should take into account the need to
minimise economic dislocation in States whose nationals habitually fished in
the zone.
If China adopted this pragmatic position, it would be similar to that of the
Philippines with respect to its historic claim to a territorial sea based on the
1898 Treaty of Paris. Like the Philippines, China could take measures to bring
its claims into conformity with the LOSC without formally abandoning its historic claim.
Clarifying Areas of Overlapping Maritime Claims in the Other
Areas in the South China Sea
Gulf of Tonkin and Areas Surrounding the Paracel Islands
This section of the South China Sea includes Hainan Island and the southern
coast of mainland China, the northern section of the coast of Vietnam, the
Gulf of Tonkin between China and Vietnam, and the Paracel Islands. The sovereignty and maritime disputes in this area are essentially between China and
Vietnam, although Taiwan has a claim similar to that of China.
Sovereignty Dispute
The Paracel Islands are located approximately equidistant from the coastlines
of Vietnam and the Chinese island of Hainan. China, Taiwan and Vietnam
all claim sovereignty over the Paracel Islands. China forcibly ejected South
Vietnamese troops from the Paracels in 1974, and they are now occupied exclusively by China.66 Vietnam continues to claim sovereignty over the islands,
but China denies the existence of a sovereignty dispute.67 Vietnamese fishermen continue to enter the waters surrounding the Paracels, and the arrest of
Vietnamese fishermen by China is a continual source of friction and tension
66
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King C. Chen, China’s War with Vietnam, 1970: Issues, Decisions, and implications (Hoover
Institution Press, Stanford, 1987) 42–48; Cable News Network (CNN), ‘China and Vietnam:
A Timeline of Conflict’, 28 January 2011, available at http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/
asiapcf/06/27/china.vietnam.timeline/; accessed 6 April 2014.
Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference on 21 June 2012,
available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/
t945296.shtml; accessed 6 April 2014. Vietnam—The Law of the Sea of Viet Nam (n 18),
Art 1.
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between China and Vietnam, as is the issue of exploration for seabed energy
resources.68
Questions will remain as to the rights and obligations of the two Claimants
in the waters surrounding the Paracels, including their rights in what would be
internal waters or territorial sea of the islands. This is not an issue of overlapping claims between opposite or adjacent States, but an issue of rights and
jurisdiction in the waters surrounding islands over which both States claim
sovereignty. Two principles of general international law that would clearly be
applicable are the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force and the
obligation to resolve any disputes in a peaceful manner.69
Maritime Claims
Vietnam has claimed an EEZ from the baselines along its coast.70 Vietnam has
not issued any official charts or geographic coordinates indicating the outer
limit lines of its EEZ, but the map accompanying its submission to the CLCS in
May 2009 does indicate the outer limit of its EEZ claim.71 In May 2009, Vietnam
made a separate submission to the CLCS claiming an extended continental
shelf in the area off its east coast, southwest of the Paracel Islands.72 China
has objected to Vietnam’s extended shelf claim, and has asked the CLCS not to
consider it because of the existence of land or maritime disputes in the area.73
One of the bases of China’s objection is that Vietnam’s claim may overlap with
China’s claims in the same area.
China has claimed an EEZ measured seawards from its territorial sea baselines, including its claimed straight baselines fronting its mainland coast, as
well as the straight baselines that it has defined around the Paracel Islands.74
68

69

70
71
72
73

74

China Detains Vietnamese Fishermen in Disputed Water, 22 March 2012, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/22/china-vietnam-idUSL3E8EM3YJ20120322;
Vietnam Lodges China Protest over Claims of Attack on Fishermen, available at http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-18/vietnam-lodges-china-protest-over-claims-ofattack-on-fishermen.html; accessed 6 April 2014. See also, for example, ‘Vietnam and
China ships “collide in the South China Sea” ’, BBC News, 7 May 2014, available at http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-27293314, accessed 23 May 2014.
Charter of the United Nations (San Francisco, 26 June 1945, in force 24 October 1945),
Art. 2(3)–(4), available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf;
accessed 6 April 2014.
Vietnam—The Law of the Sea of Viet Nam (n 18), Art. 15.
CLCS, Joint Submission—Malaysia-Viet Nam, Executive Summary (n 22).
CLCS, Submission—Viet Nam (n 29).
Communications Received with regard to the Joint Submission made by Malaysia-Viet
Nam (n 22), China (7 May 2009 and 14 April 2011); Communications Received with regard
to the Submission made by Viet Nam (n 29), China (7 May 2009 and 14 April 2011).
China—Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Act (n 18), Art 2.
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However, it has not issued any charts or geographic coordinates showing the
limits of its EEZ claim in this area. China has submitted preliminary information to the CLCS suggesting that it may make a further submission regarding
extended continental shelf limits and such a submission may well involve this
area.75 China’s claim could conceivably overlap with the extended continental
shelf claim of Vietnam.
Woody Island, the largest island in the Paracels, hosts the Chinese administrative centre known as Sansha City, as well as military facilities, and is
about the same size as the 12 largest islands in the Spratly Islands combined.76
Therefore, a strong argument can be made that Woody Island is entitled to an
EEZ and continental shelf of its own. Also, the information available suggests
that several other islands in the Paracels are large enough to be entitled, in
principle, to an EEZ and continental shelf of their own.77
If an EEZ is claimed from the largest islands in the Paracels, it would extend
east into the area beyond the outer limits of the EEZ claims measured from the
mainland coasts of Vietnam and China. The EEZ generated from the Paracels
would include Macclesfield Bank, but would not extend as far as Scarborough
Shoal. An EEZ from the Paracels would also overlap with the EEZ claimed from
the largest islands in the Spratlys. The result would be that most of the area in
the middle of the South China Sea north of the Spratlys would be an area of
overlapping claims.
The impact of an EEZ claim from the largest islands in the Paracels in the
north-western part of the South China Sea is indicated in Fig. 5. In preparing
this figure, the EEZ from the Paracels was measured from the largest islands,
not from the straight baselines employed by China around the islands. This
is because the straight baselines employed by China around the Paracel
Islands are not in conformity with the LOSC.78 However, the area of EEZ
that can be claimed from the Paracels is not significantly reduced if the EEZ
75

76

77

78

CLCS, Preliminary Information—China (n 30), paragraph 10 “China reserves its right to
make submissions on the outer limits of the continental shelf that extends beyond 200
nautical miles in the East China Sea and in other sea areas”; also Submission—China
(n 30).
China Raises Administrative Status of South China Sea Islands, 21 June 2012, available at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-06/21/c_131668568.htm; accessed 7 April
2014.
The following islands in the Paracels may be large enough to generate an EEZ of their
own: Woody Island and Rocky Islet, Lincoln Island, Triton Island, Pattle Island, Duncan
Island, West Sand, Money Island, Robert Island, North Island, Drummond Island, Tree
Island, South Island, Middle Island, Passuh Keah and South Sand. See Explanatory Note
in the Appendix to this paper.
See China’s straight baselines claims and other States’ responses (n 8).
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is measured from the largest islands rather than from the straight baselines
connecting them.
Fig. 5 illustrates 12-nm territorial seas for the Paracel Islands themselves,
together with theoretical equidistance lines between the Paracel Islands on
the one hand and the mainland coasts of both China and Vietnam on the other.

figure 5
79

Overlapping maritime claims in the North-western South China Sea79

The continuous, that is, “joined up”, version of the nine-dashed line illustrated in the maps
accompanying this chapter was formed by plotting the dashed line segments extracted
from a map attached in the Chinese note to the Secretary-General of the United Nations
in its response to Malaysia-Vietnam’s extended continental shelf submission and then
interpolating a line to connect these dashes. There is therefore some inherent uncertainty
in the precise location of these lines. Available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/
submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdf; accessed 7 April 2014. It is
worth emphasising that China has never officially issued coordinates for the nine-dashed
line nor depicted this line as a continuous one.
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Once again, for the purposes of this exercise the straight baselines of both
China and Vietnam have not been taken into account due to their excessive
character and normal baselines have been used to generate theoretical equidistance lines. This provides an indication of what can be viewed as the maximum maritime area that could be realistically associated with these disputed
islands under the LOSC and thus a plausible area of overlapping claims, as both
China and Vietnam claim sovereignty over the Paracel Islands. Additionally, a
theoretical equidistance line between China and Vietnam ignoring the Paracel
Islands is illustrated by proceeding seawards from the mouth of the Gulf of
Tonkin into the north-western part of the South China Sea and out to the
200-nm limit from normal baselines along mainland coasts (including Hainan
Island), allowing 12-nm territorial sea semi-enclaves around features among
the Paracel Islands, as appropriate.
Because the EEZ generated from the largest islands in the Paracel group
into the potential central high seas “pocket” beyond 200 nm from surrounding mainland coasts would include Macclesfield Bank, this would solve a difficult legal problem for China. China has claimed sovereignty over Macclesfield
Bank, even though it is a submerged reef that is not subject to a sovereignty
claim.80 However, if Macclesfield Bank lies within the EEZ claimed from the
largest islands in the Paracels, China would have a basis to claim sovereign
rights to explore and exploit the natural resources in and under the water in
Macclesfield Bank. In such a case, it would not be necessary for China to pursue its sovereignty claim over Macclesfield Bank, which is clearly a problematic one to sustain in international law terms.
Maritime Boundaries
China and Vietnam have reached agreement on a maritime boundary in the
section of the Gulf of Tonkin extending seaward from their land boundary.81
80

81

People’s Republic of China—Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (n 18),
Article 2: “The land territory of the People’s Republic of China includes the mainland
of the People’s Republic of China and its offshore islands; Taiwan and all islands
appertaining thereto including the Diaoyu Islands; the Penghu Islands; the Dongsha
Islands; the Xisha Islands; the Zhongsha Islands and the Nansha Islands; as well as all
the other islands belonging to the People’s Republic of China.” This English translation is
available in Office of Policy, Law and Regulation, State Oceanic Administration, Collection
of the Sea Laws and Regulations of the People’s Republic of China (Ocean Press, 1998), 186.
The English names of the four groups of islands in the South China Sea are Pratas Island
(Dongsha Islands), Paracel Islands (Xisha Islands), Macclesfield Bank (Zhongsha Islands),
and Spratly Islands (Nansha Islands).
Agreement between China and Viet Nam on the Maritime Delimitation in Beibu Bay/Bac
Bo Gulf (n 25).
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Additionally, they reached an accord concerning fishing activities in specified
areas straddling the agreed boundary line.82 Negotiations are continuing to
extend the existing boundary south-eastwards, and in October 2013 the two
States agreed to undertake joint seismic surveys in this area.83 The current
boundary could be extended for a short distance without too much difficulty
(see Fig. 5). However, it will be extremely difficult for the two States to extend
this boundary too much farther because it will then intrude into the maritime
zones of the disputed Paracel Islands.
The ocean space between the Paracels and the Vietnamese coast is likely
to be a continual source of friction. China is likely to maintain that as the
islands in the Paracels are entitled to an EEZ of their own, the waters between
the islands and the Vietnamese coast are an area of overlapping EEZ claims
between opposite States. Vietnam is likely to maintain that as it has sovereignty over the Paracels, all the waters between its coast and the Paracels are
either its territorial sea or its EEZ.
Vietnam officially protested China’s use of straight baselines around the
Paracels.84 However, it has not taken any official position on whether the
Paracel Islands are entitled to an EEZ and continental shelf of their own. Given
the size of Woody Island, it may be in Vietnam’s own interests to recognise that
the largest islands in the Paracels are entitled to an EEZ of their own.
In addition to overlapping EEZ claims, complex issues arise because of
the outer continental shelf claim by Vietnam north-west of the Spratlys.85
Vietnam’s claim to an extended continental shelf in this area will overlap with
the EEZ claim of China from the Paracel Islands. China has indicated this in its
diplomatic notes regarding Vietnam’s claim.86 This raises the issue of whether
an extended shelf claim will “trump” an EEZ claim from offshore islands in the
82

83

84
85
86

Agreement on Fishery Co-operation in the Tonkin Gulf between the Government of the
People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (Beijing,
25 December 2000, in force 30 June 2004), in Nguyen Hong Thao, ‘Maritime Delimitation
and Fishery Cooperation in the Tonkin Gulf’ (2005) 36(1) ODIL 25–44, at pp. 35–41.
Teddy Ng, ‘China, Vietnam to set up Group to Explore Disputed South China Sea’,
14 October 2013, available at http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1331106/chinavietnam-set-group-explore-disputed-south-china-sea; accessed 7 April 2014.
Daniel J. Dzurek, ‘The People’s Republic of China Straight Baseline Claim’ (1996) 4(2) IBRU
Boundary and Security Bulletin Summer 77–89, at p. 80.
CLCS, Submission—Viet Nam (n 29).
In its Note Verbale of 7 May 2009 objecting to a separate Submission of Viet Nam
(n 29), China stated that “the above Submission by the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam
has seriously infringed China’s sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the South
China Sea”.
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same area with regard to rights and jurisdiction over the seabed and subsoil.
The decision of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in the
Bangladesh/Myanmar case suggests that this is a possibility in some cases.87 If
so, there may ultimately have to be separate EEZ and outer continental shelf
boundary agreements in the area, although the prospects of this being realised
in the foreseeable future are dim in light of the parties’ irreconcilable positions
on sovereignty over the Paracel Islands.
Prospects for Joint Development in Areas of Overlapping Claims
China and Vietnam seem to have only two options if they want an alternative
other than continued uncertainty and friction. First, they can decide to take
the issue of which State has the better claim of sovereignty over the Paracel
Islands to an international court or tribunal, and once the sovereignty issue is
resolved, they can attempt to negotiate an EEZ boundary agreement. It seems
unlikely that China would even consider this option, given the fact that it controls the Paracels, has invested heavily in them and does not even acknowledge
the existence of a sovereignty dispute over them.88 It is also uncertain whether
Vietnam would seriously entertain this option, given its own oft-repeated
uncompromising position, analogous to China’s, regarding sovereignty over
the Paracels.89
The second option would be to agree, either formally or informally, to set
aside the sovereignty dispute over the Paracels and to try to reach an agreement on a combination of maritime boundaries and JDAs in areas of overlapping maritime claims. For example, the existing maritime boundary agreement
between China and Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin could be extended from
the terminus of their existing agreement in a south-eastward direction until
a potential tripoint between the mainland coasts (including Hainan Island)
and a full effect equidistance line involving the Paracel Islands, without undue
87

88
89

International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS): Dispute Concerning the Maritime
Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar),
Judgment of 14 March 2012, paras 463–474, available at http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/
itlos/documents/cases/case_no_16/C16_Judgment_14_03_2012_rev.pdf; accessed 7 April
2014.
Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference on 21 June 21 2012
(n 67).
See, for example, Note from the Permanent Mission of the Socialist Republic of Viet
Nam to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary General of the United Nations,
86/HC-2009, 18 August 2009, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/
submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/vnm_re_phl_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdf; accessed 7 April
2014.
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difficulty (see Fig. 5). Additionally, without either China or Vietnam formally
giving up their respective sovereignty claims to the Paracels, JDAs could be
reached in the areas of overlapping claims between the disputed islands and
the mainland coasts of the parties.
Under such a scenario, it is conceivable that each side might have a greater
share in the joint zone on “their” side of the theoretical line ignoring the influence of the Paracel Islands. Moreover, Vietnam and China could agree to
jointly develop the resources in areas to the south-east of the Paracels, including Macclesfield Bank.90 It is recognised that the compromises and concessions require significant reserves of political will. Accordingly, the potential
scenarios outlined here are likely to prove difficult to realise in practice. The
above suggestions are not, however, intended as a proposed solution, but
as examples of the sort of options available to the two States in a negotiating context where the primary objective is to achieve a mutually beneficial
solution in an area that will otherwise be a protracted source of tension and
potential conflict.
Area between the Philippines and Taiwan and China
The north-east section of the South China Sea is bordered by China and
Taiwan in the north and the Philippines in the east. There is one significant
offshore atoll in the area, Pratas Island. The Pratas Island consists of a number
of features located on an atoll that is 2.8 km long and 0.865 km wide, located
about 140 nm off the coast of China and about 240 nm west of Taiwan.91 Pratas
Island is claimed by China and Taiwan, and occupied by Taiwan. Given the size
of Pratas Island, it can be argued in good faith that it is not a rock within the
meaning of Article 121(3) of the LOSC, but an island entitled, in principle, to an
EEZ and continental shelf of its own.
Areas of Overlapping Maritime Claims
The Philippines claims an EEZ from its archipelagic baselines.92 This produces
an area of overlapping EEZ claims between opposite States which would be
90

91

92

If the Philippines claimed an extended continental shelf beyond 200 nm from its
archipelago, some of its extended continental shelf area might overlap with the EEZ
generated from the Paracel Islands, which may include Macclesfield Bank.
Tungsha Atolls (Pratas), available at http://island.giee.ntnu.edu.tw/islandengweb/007.
htm; Marine National Park Headquarters, Introduction to Dongsha Atoll National Park,
available at http://marine.cpami.gov.tw/english/index.php?option=com_efpublication&
view=pdetailen&id=4&Itemid=79; accessed 7 April 2014.
Philippines—Presidential Decree No. 1599 of 11 June 1978 Establishing an Exclusive
Economic Zone and for other Purposes (n 18), Section 1.
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governed by Article 74 of the LOSC. The Philippines has submitted a claim to
the CLCS for an extended continental shelf in Benham Rise, off its east coast,
and has indicated that it intends to claim an extended shelf in other areas,93
which may include the area in the direction of Pratas Island and China’s southern coast. China’s future claim to an extended continental shelf in this area
is likely to overlap with the future extended continental shelf claim of the
Philippines.
Taiwan claims an EEZ from the straight baselines around its main island.
It also claims an EEZ from the Pratas Island, using a combination of normal
baselines and straight baselines.94 This area of overlapping claims includes the
Luzon Strait between Taiwan and the Philippines, which is a major route for
international navigation. Taiwan is not a party to the LOSC. Therefore, it is not
eligible to submit an extended continental shelf claim to the CLCS.
The overlapping EEZ claims in the area of Luzon Strait involve Taiwan and
the Philippines, because Taiwan has effective control of Taiwan Island and
Pratas Island. To define the possible EEZ boundary in this sector of the South
China Sea, an equidistance line can be drawn between Taiwan and Pratas
Island on one side, and the nearest Philippine islands on the other side (see
Fig. 6). If the equidistance lines were drawn from basepoints on the largest
islands rather than from the straight baselines, it would avoid any problems
relating to the legality of the baselines employed by Taiwan. In this context it
can be observed that the Philippines would be likely to push for recognition
of its archipelagic baselines. However, although this would likely be a point
of discussion, the influence of the archipelagic baselines of the Philippines
on the construction of the theoretical equidistance line is marginal, because
an equidistance line constructed from basepoints on the islands would be the
almost the same as one constructed from the archipelagic baselines.
The fact that the Taiwan’s use of straight baselines may not be in compliance with the LOSC is not likely to have a significant effect on securing
an agreement on the EEZ boundary (or a provisional fisheries enforcement
line) between Taiwan and the Philippines, because the baselines need not be
taken into account in the negotiations of the EEZ boundary. As Bautista and
Schofield have noted, if a theoretical equidistance line is constructed between
the Philippines and Taiwan, it would proceed from an eastern tripoint where
93
94

CLCS, Submission—Philippines (n 30).
Republic of China—Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (n 18),
Art 4; Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf (n 18), Art
2; Territorial Sea Baseline, Outer Limits of the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone
Amended, 26 November 2009, available at http://navy.mnd.gov.tw/english/Publish.
aspx?cnid=844&p=38637&Level=1; accessed 7 April 2014.
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the claims of Taiwan and the Philippines meet those generated from Japan’s
Sakishima Islands group, then proceed through the Bashi Channel in the
Luzon Strait into the South China Sea “proper” (see Fig. 6).95
Further to the south-west, a theoretical equidistance line between China
and the Philippines relies on basepoints located on Pratas Island on one side
and the western coast of the major Philippine island of Luzon on the other. In
light of the small size and thus restricted coastal front of Pratas Island in comparison to Luzon, if maritime boundary delimitation negotiations were ever
initiated with China/Taiwan, the Philippines would be highly likely to argue
that Pratas Island be accorded a substantially reduced effect, if not entirely
ignored and “enclaved” within their territorial sea areas. Further, if a theoretical equidistance line is generated between the mainland coast of China and
the Philippines, baseline issues and particularly the questionable straight baselines of China fronting its mainland coast would likely prove to be key points
of discussion. The Philippines would be likely to insist that any equidistance
line be measured from China’s coast, that is, from its normal baselines, rather
than from its straight baselines (see Fig. 6). The maritime area lying between
an equidistance line according full weight to the Paracel Islands and one giving them nil effect and, moreover, ignoring the potential influence of China’s
claimed straight baselines, represents a theoretical area of overlapping maritime claims. As illustrated in Fig. 6, Pratas Island also has a potential impact
on the scope of the above-mentioned high seas pocket in the northern-central
part of the South China Sea.
Prospects for Joint Development in Areas of Overlapping Claims
Special legal problems arise in reaching an agreement on the EEZ boundary in
this area because of the legal status of Taiwan. The position of the Governments
of both China and Taiwan is that there is one China and Taiwan is part of China.
The Republic of China Government on Taiwan is recognised by a small number of States as the legitimate government of China. The People’s Republic of
China Government in Beijing represents China in the United Nations. Taiwan
was not invited to participate in the negotiation and signing of the LOSC
and it was unable to become a party to it.96 The Philippines, like the other
95

96

See Lowell Bautista and Clive Schofield, ‘Philippine-China Border Relations: Cautious
Engagement Amidst Tensions’, in Bruce Elleman, Stephen Kotkin and Clive H. Schofield
(eds) Beijing’s Power and China’s Borders: Twenty Neighbors in Asia (M.E. Sharpe Publishers,
Armonk/New York, 2012) 235–250, at pp. 237–238. See also, Prescott and Schofield (n 14),
at p. 434.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of China (Taiwan), ‘Declaration of the Republic of
China on the Outer Limits of Its Continental Shelf’ (12 May 2009), available at http://
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Overlapping maritime claims in the North-eastern South China Sea

ASEAN member States, follows a ‘One China Policy’ under which it officially
recognises that Taiwan is part of China.97 This makes it extremely difficult, if
not impossible, for the Philippines to negotiate an EEZ boundary with Taiwan
in this area. China is likely to object if the Philippines and Taiwan enter into

97

www.mofa.gov.tw/EnOfficial/ArticleDetail/DetailDefault/ad125edc-048e-45de-93bc11427232687b?arfid=7b3b4d7a-8ee7-43a9-97f8-7f3d313ad781&opno=84ba3639-be424966-b873-78a267de8cf1; accessed 7 April 2014.
Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in the Philippines, Taiwan-Philippine Relations,
available at http://www.roc-taiwan.org/PH/ct.asp?xItem=57628&CtNode=4705&mp=272
&xp1; accessed 7 April 2014.
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formal maritime boundary negotiations because it would be contrary to the
‘One China Policy’.
On the other hand, the Taipei authorities, not the Beijing authorities, are
in effective control not only of Pratas Island, but arguably also of the waters
in this area, both in the vicinity of Taiwan itself, but also proximate to Pratas
Island; and Taiwanese fishing vessels fish in these waters. Therefore, for an
agreement to be effective, Taiwan would have to be a party to it, or at least
not challenge it. In this context, it is perhaps noteworthy that Taiwan was able
to conclude a joint fisheries agreement with Japan in April 2013 in respect
of parts of the southern East China Sea—suggesting the possibility of an
analogous arrangement being applied to parts of the north-eastern South
China Sea.98
It has been reported that following an incident in 2013, in which the
Philippines coast guard fired on a Taiwanese fishing vessel and killed a
Taiwanese fisherman, the Taiwan authorities have requested the Philippines
authorities to enter into some kind of provisional arrangement with respect
to fishing in these waters in order to prevent potential conflicts in the area of
overlapping EEZ claims.99 Any arrangement must be consistent with the ‘One
China Policy’ so that it does not raise an objection from China. The dispute
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99

The agreement does, however, exclude the 12-nm territorial waters of the disputed
Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands and its conclusion is without prejudice to the parties’
positions concerning that dispute. See Shih Hsiu-chuan, ‘Taiwan, Japan ink fisheries
agreement’, Taipei Times, 11 April 2013. Available at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/
front/archives/2013/04/11/2003559323/2; accessed 7 April 2014.
Philippines and Taiwan have agreed to: refrain from using force in enforcing fisheries
laws and regulations, inform each other of their respective maritime law enforcement
procedures; establish a mechanism for prompt notification when an enforcement
operation is underway against any fishing vessel of the other party, and set up a mechanism
for the prompt release of detained fishing vessels and their crews. See the Press Release of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan), 8 August 2013, available
at http://www.mofa.gov.tw/EnOfficial/ArticleDetail/DetailDefault/eb8081fd-8616-42638b96-f443c63b3294?arfid=12e3ae93-5bcb-43a6-90cb-05ff0268cafc&opno=3874e0ced467-4f72-b271-a5af8d47ab33; See also Camille Diola, ‘Taiwan Ready to Revive
Fishery Talks with Philippines’, 8 August 2013, available at http://www.philstar.com/
headlines/2013/08/08/1066891/taiwan-ready-revive-fishery-talks-philippines; Elaine Hou,
‘Taiwan, Philippines to Set Up Working Group for Fishery Issues’, 22 October 2012,
available at http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201310220048.aspx; Kelvin Huang and James
Lee, ‘Foreign Ministry Reports Progress in Taiwan-Philippines Fishery Talks’, 28 October
2013, available at http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201310280016.aspx; accessed 7 April
2014.
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settlement procedures in Part XV will not be relevant to any dispute between
the Philippines and Taiwan because Taiwan is not a party to the LOSC.
A further potential complication in this area is the fact that the theoretical equidistance lines outlined above and illustrated in Fig. 6 cut through the
Philippines Treaty Limits area or rectangular “box”. This may lead to complications in pursuing negotiations, particularly towards maritime boundary delimitation, on the Philippines domestic front.100
In conclusion, this area of the South China Sea presents issues of boundary delimitation and fisheries cooperation between China, Taiwan and the
Philippines which are complicated in particular by the status of Taiwan.
Nonetheless, it is conceivable that joint arrangements and other provisional
arrangements of a practical nature could be agreed upon, for example in relation to fisheries resources, as has already occurred in parts of the East China
Sea, if the governments concerned recognise their common interests and can
agree on practical steps to cooperate in this area.
Scarborough Shoal Area
Scarborough Shoal (or Reef) is located approximately 124 nm from the
Philippines, well within the EEZ claimed by the Philippines from its main
archipelago.101 Scarborough Shoal is a large atoll with a lagoon of about 150
km² surrounded by a reef.102 Most of the reef is either completely submerged
or above water only at low tide, but it contains four to six small rocks which are
permanently above water at high tide.103 Some Chinese writers have claimed
that it is part of Macclesfield Bank,104 but given the distance from Macclesfield
100
101

102
103

104

See discussion in text at footnotes supra 9–16; Also see Bautista and Schofield (n 95), at
pp. 238 and 242–243.
Republic of the Philippine, Official Gazette, ‘Philippines Position on Bajo de Masinloc
(Scarborough Shoal) and the Waters within its Vicinity’ Department of Foreign Affairs
(18 April 2012), available at http://www.gov.ph/2012/04/18/philippine-position-on-bajode-masinloc-and-the-waters-within-its-vicinity/; accessed 7 April 2014.
Keyuan Zou, ‘Scarborough Reef: A New Flashpoint in Sino-Philippine Relations?’ (1999)
7(2) IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 71–81, at p. 71.
Ibid.; Philippines Position on Bajo de Masincloc (n 101). The relevant British Admiralty
Sailing Directions (Pilot) describe Scarborough Reef as being “step-to on all sides and
consists of a narrow belt of coral enclosing a lagoon of clear blue water”; South Rock, at
3m high, is the “tallest rock” located at the south-east extremity of the reef. See United
Kingdom Hydrographic Office, Admiralty Sailing Directions: China Sea Pilot (Volume 2,
9th ed., UKHO, Taunton, 2010) 74.
Zou (n 102), at p. 71; Keyuan Zou, ‘The Chinese Traditional Maritime Boundary Line in the
South China Sea and Its Legal Consequences for the Resolution of the Dispute over the
Spratly Islands’ (1999) 14(1) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (IJMCL) 27–55,
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Bank and the depth of the waters in the area between them, it is difficult to
argue that it is geographically part of Macclesfield Bank.
The rocks in the Scarborough Shoal are very small and contain no vegetation. Consequently, they appear to be a classic case of “rocks which cannot
sustain human habitation or economic life of their own”. Following an incident
in 2012, in which a naval vessel of the Philippines arrested Chinese fishing vessels in the lagoon, China has allegedly taken ‘effective control’ of the atoll.105 It
reportedly has coast guard vessels in the area and allegedly does not allow vessels from the Philippines to enter the lagoon.106
Areas of Overlapping Maritime Claims
The Philippines has claimed an EEZ from the archipelagic baselines surrounding its main archipelago.107 Although it has yet to issue charts or geographic
coordinates setting out the outer limit lines of its EEZ, an EEZ claim from its
archipelagic baselines would be consistent with the LOSC, and would include
the waters around Scarborough Shoal.
China, Taiwan and the Philippines all claim sovereignty over Scarborough
Shoal and over the 12-nm territorial sea surrounding it.108 The disputes concerning Scarborough Shoal are essentially disputes between the Philippines

105

106

107
108

at p. 28; Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of the Philippines,
‘Huangyan Dao Shi Wen (Ten Basic Questions regarding the Scarborough Shoal)’, 16 June
2012, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceph/chn/zgxw/t941671.htm; accessed
7 April 2014.
M. Taylor Fravel, ‘China’s Island Strategy: “Redefine the Status Quo”’, 1 November 2012,
available at http://thediplomat.com/china-power/chinas-island-strategy-redefine-thestatus-quo/; Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on
1 July 2013, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/
2511_665403/t1055206.shtml; accessed 7 April 2014.
Jojo Malig, ‘China Claims Control of Scarborough Waters’, 24 May 2012, available at http://
www.abs-cbnnews.com/-depth/05/24/12/china-claims-control-scarborough-waters;
Tarra Quismundo, ‘China’s Surveillance Ships back at Scarborough Shoal’, 8 January 2013,
available at http://globalnation.inquirer.net/80007/chinas-surveillance-ships-back-atscarborough-shoal; accessed 7 April 2014.
Philippines—Presidential Decree No. 1599 of 11 June 1978 Establishing an Exclusive
Economic Zone and for other Purposes (n 18), Section 1.
Philippines—Republic Act No. 9522 (n 17), Section 2(2); Foreign Ministry Spokesperson
Hua Chunying’s Remarks on the Philippines’ Efforts in Pushing for the Establishment
of the Arbitral Tribunal in Relation to the Disputes between China and the Philippines
in the South China Sea, 26 April 2013, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/
xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/t1035577.shtml; accessed 7 April 2014.
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and China, with Taiwan taking a position analogous to that of China. Because
the rocks on the shoal are islands as defined in Article 121 of the LOSC (that is,
naturally formed areas of land surrounded by and above water at high tide),
these rocks are subject to a claim of sovereignty.
None of the Claimants have designated baselines for measuring the territorial sea from the Scarborough Shoal. If the rocks above water at high tide are
situated on an atoll, the baseline for measuring the territorial sea may be the
seaward low-water line of the reef.109 Because this is a very large atoll, using
the seaward low-water line of the reef as the baseline could significantly
increase the area of territorial sea surrounding the shoal. Also, the waters
inside the lagoon enclosed by straight baselines would be internal waters.
Alternatively, if there are drying rocks on the atoll that are within 12 nm of any
of the rocks that meet the definition of an island, the drying rocks would be
low-tide elevations that can be used as basepoints in determining the baselines from which the territorial sea would be measured.110
Two major issues concerning Scarborough Shoal are not governed by the
LOSC, but by general principles of international law. First, which State has
the better claim to sovereignty over the islands? Second, what are the rights
and obligations of the Claimants in the waters surrounding the disputed
islands?
Relevance of LOSC Dispute Settlement Procedures
The most contentious issue with respect to Scarborough Shoal, other than
the sovereignty dispute, is the legal status of the islands and their entitlement to maritime zones. The Philippines’ legislation on baselines states that
Scarborough Shoal is governed by the regime of islands in Article 121 of the
LOSC, without stating how Article 121 would apply.111 However, the position of
the Philippines in its arbitration case with China is that Scarborough Shoal is
not entitled to an EEZ or continental shelf of its own because the small rocks
fall within Article 121(3) of the LOSC, which provides that “rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own” shall have no
EEZ or continental shelf.112 This issue is important to the Philippines because
Scarborough Shoal is situated in the EEZ which the Philippines claims from
its archipelagic baselines. If the rocks are entitled only to a 12-nm territorial
109
110
111
112

LOSC Art. 6.
LOSC Art. 13.
Philippines—Republic Act No. 9522 (n 17), Section 2(2).
Philippines—Notification and Statement of Claims on West Philippine Sea (n 43).
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sea, then the only ‘disputed waters’ where China could claim any rights would
be the 12-nm territorial sea surrounding the islands. The waters seaward of
the outer limit of Scarborough Shoal’s territorial sea would be the EEZ of the
Philippines, where it has sovereign rights to explore and exploit the natural
resources (see Fig. 6).
On the other hand, if the Arbitral Tribunal were to hold that the islands
in the Scarborough Shoal are in principle entitled to an EEZ of their own, an
issue of overlapping EEZ would arise. It would then be a case of delimitation
of the EEZ boundaries between opposite States, which is governed by Article
74. Given that China has exercised its right under Article 298 to opt out of the
compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions for disputes on the interpretation or application of Article 74, this issue would have to be resolved in
bilateral negotiations.
Conclusion on Scarborough Shoal
The area around Scarborough Shoal provokes a bilateral problem between
China and the Philippines. Some of the issues concerning the waters in and
around the shoal could be resolved by the Arbitral Tribunal in the pending
case between the Philippines and China if it decides that it has jurisdiction
to hear the case. On the other hand, it might be possible for the two States to
settle the case before an Award is issued by the Arbitral Tribunal. The issues
concerning Scarborough Shoal are fairly straightforward compared to many
areas in the South China Sea. If China and the Philippines could establish the
necessary trust and political will, it might be possible for them to reach an amicable arrangement with respect to fishing in and around Scarborough Shoal,
provided such arrangements, like all provisional arrangements, are without
prejudice to the underlying sovereignty disputes and a final agreement delimiting the maritime boundaries.113
Indonesia’s EEZ Boundaries off the Natuna Islands
There are no disputed islands in the south-western-most section of the South
China Sea. Indonesia has undisputed sovereignty over the Natuna Islands.
Area of Overlapping Maritime Claims
Indonesia has agreements delimiting its continental shelf boundaries in this
area with Malaysia to both the east and west and with Vietnam to the north.114
113
114

LOSC Arts. 74(3) and 83(3).
Agreement between the Government of Malaysia and the Government of Indonesia
on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelves between the two Countries (27 October
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Indonesia negotiated these agreements in 1969 and 2003, respectively.
Although the area encompassed by China’s nine-dashed line map cuts across
these agreed continental shelf boundaries, as illustrated on Fig. 7, no available
record indicates that China has objected to Indonesia’s boundary agreements
with Malaysia and Vietnam.115 This raises the issue of whether, because of its
silence, China is precluded from asserting any rights to resources on the continental shelf in this area, even though the area is partially inside China’s ninedashed line.
Indonesia’s claim to an EEZ in this area extends beyond the limits of its continental shelf boundary agreements with Malaysia and Vietnam.116 This indicates that Indonesia is not prepared to use the continental shelf boundaries to
delimit its EEZ boundaries with Malaysia and Vietnam. Therefore, Indonesia
must negotiate bilateral agreements with its neighbours setting out the EEZ
boundaries (see Fig. 7).

115

116

1969); Agreement between the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and
the Government of the Republic of Indonesia Concerning the Delimitation of the
Continental Shelf Boundary (26 June 2003, in force 29 May 2007), available at http://www.
un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/IDN.htm; accessed 7 April
2014.
For example, Oegroseno, referring to the continental shelf boundary agreed between
Indonesia and Malaysia in 1969 (n 114), states unequivocally that “[n]ot a single country
has challenged the validity of this 45 year-old treaty that divides rather significantly
certain segments of the SCS [South China Sea]”. See Arif Havas Oegroseno, ‘Indonesia,
South China Sea and the 11/10/9-dashed lines’, Jakarta Post, 9 April 2014. Available at
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/04/09/indonesia-south-china-sea-and-11109dashed-lines.html; accessed 15 April 2014.
Indonesia—Act No. 5 of 1983 on the Indonesian Exclusive Economic Zone, 18 October
1983, Art 2, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/
PDFFILES/IDN_1983_Act.pdf; that Indonesia’s EEZ claim extends beyond its agreed
continental shelf boundaries with neighbouring States is confirmed by reference to
official Indonesian government mapping, notably its National Map which is issued on an
annual basis and which clearly illustrates an Indonesian EEZ limit that is further seaward
than Indonesia’s agreed continental shelf boundary lines. See, for example, Bakosurtanal,
The National Map of the Unitary States of Indonesia [Peta Negara Kesatuan Republik
Indonesia] (generally referred to as Peta NKRI), 2013, Cibinong, Indonesia. The same limits
are also reflected in depictions of Indonesia’s fisheries management zone or Wilayah
Pengelolaan Perikanan (WPP), in keeping with the Indonesian Ministry of Marine Affairs
and Fisheries (MMAF) Regulation Number 1 of 2009 on Fisheries Management Areas,
available at http://infohukum.kkp.go.id/files_permen/PER%2001%20MEN%202009.pdf
(in Indonesian) accessed 7 April 2014.
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figure 7

Maritime boundaries and overlapping maritime claims in the South-western South
China Sea

Indonesia has been resistant to any suggestion that it must negotiate a maritime boundary agreement with China because its maritime zones overlap with
those claimed by China.117 However, if China were to claim an EEZ from the
largest islands in the Spratlys and draw a full-effect equidistance line from the
larger Spratly Islands, it would create an overlap with the north-eastern part of
Indonesia’s EEZ claim. In such a case, Indonesia is likely to take the view that
the small isolated and largely uninhabited Spratly Islands should be accorded
a reduced effect so that the claims from the Spratly Islands would not overlap
with Indonesia’s EEZ claim from the Natuna Islands.118
Conclusions
The major obstacle which must be overcome before JDAs can be seriously considered is to reach agreement on the areas of overlapping claims where JDAs
117
118

See in particular, Oegroseno (n 115).
See I. Made Andi Arsana and Clive Schofield, ‘Indonesia’s “Invisible” Border with China’, in
Elleman, Kotkin and Schofield (n 95) 60–79, at pp. 67–70.
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and other cooperative provisional arrangements can take place. At the present
time, there is substantial uncertainty with respect to the areas of overlapping
EEZ claims between the mainland coasts and the islands. This is because none
of the Claimants have indicated which islands, if any, they believe are entitled to an EEZ and continental shelf of their own. Furthermore, none of the
Claimants have indicated the baselines on the islands over which they claim
sovereignty or issued charts or geographic coordinates showing the outer limit
of the EEZ claims from the islands.
Agreement on areas for joint development is not possible if China maintains that the area for joint development must include all of the ocean space
within the nine-dashed line. On the other hand, agreement on areas for joint
development is also not possible if the ASEAN Claimants insist that none of
the disputed islands in the South China Sea are entitled to an EEZ and continental shelf of their own.
There are several advantages to pursuing discussions to agree on areas of
overlapping claims where joint development can take place. First, the arrangements in areas of overlapping claims would be without prejudice to sovereignty
claims over the islands or final boundary delimitation agreements between the
islands and the mainland coasts. Second, the difficult issues regarding the status of the extended continental shelf claims and their overlap with EEZ claims
from the islands could be avoided. Third, the Claimants could remain on the
features they presently occupy, again without prejudice to a final settlement of
the disputes. Fourth, it would not be necessary to determine the status of each
and every geographic feature if Claimants could agree on which of the larger
islands in the Spratlys and Paracels are entitled in principle to an EEZ and continental shelf of their own.
China could trigger a paradigm shift in its disputes in the South China Sea
if it were to formally declare an EEZ from the largest islands in the Spratly
Islands and Paracel Islands and issue charts indicating the outer limit of its
EEZ claims from the islands. If China made such an EEZ claim, it would set the
stage for serious negotiations on setting aside the disputes, defining the areas
of overlapping claims, and pursuing negotiations for JDAs and other “provisional arrangements of a practical nature” under Article 74(3) of the LOSC. In
our view, such a move would go a long way towards both clarifying claims and
de-escalating the South China Sea disputes.
The advantage for China in making such a claim is that it would be consistent with the LOSC. In addition, it would leave a large area of overlapping
EEZ claims that would be subject to the provisions in Article 74. The States
concerned would be under an obligation to comply with Article 74(3) and to
make every effort to enter into “provisional arrangements of a practical nature”,
such as JDAs. Furthermore, they would be under an obligation not to take any
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unilateral actions which would jeopardise or hamper the reaching of a final
agreement on the maritime boundaries. In other words, the unilateral claim by
China would define the area of overlapping claims and establish a legal basis
consistent with the LOSC for joint development in the area of overlapping
claims. Another advantage for China if it followed this course of action is that
the ASEAN Claimants would not have the option of invoking the compulsory
procedures entailing binding decisions in section 2 of Part XV of the LOSC on
the settlement of disputes.
The ASEAN Claimants would also benefit if China were to exercise this
option. This is because it would clarify which areas of their EEZs were not subject to overlapping claims. They could then exercise their sovereign rights and
jurisdiction in these areas without fear of any interference and without any
prospect of their right to the natural resources in these areas of their EEZs
being called into question.
If China defined its EEZ claim from the Paracel Islands, it would complicate
its bilateral negotiations for defining its boundary with Vietnam. However, it
would clarify the issues which China and Vietnam must address in this area.
Clarifying the dimensions of areas of overlapping maritime claims involving
the disputed islands represents an essential first step towards discussion on
potential joint development areas. As illustrated by boundary delimitation and
joint fishing arrangements between China and Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin,
a solution may not be impossible.
The issues in the remaining areas in the other sectors in the South China
Sea are far less complex. The Scarborough Shoal area is a territorial sovereignty dispute between China and the Philippines which could be set aside
by provisional arrangements to jointly develop the fisheries resources in the
waters in and surrounding the shoal. The area between the Philippines and
Taiwan is a boundary delimitation dispute complicated by the role of Pratas
Island, baselines issues and the legal status of Taiwan; however, it could be
resolved through provisional arrangements between the three parties with
respect to, for example, the joint development of the fisheries resources. The
area off Indonesia’s Natuna Island is such a distance from any disputed islands
that the degree of overlapping claims is constrained and is arguably of limited
interest to China. However, if an equidistance line were constructed between
Indonesia’s Natuna Islands and the largest islands in the Spratlys, some overlap
would appear to exist, and this may have to be addressed. Nevertheless, a much
higher priority for Indonesia will be to negotiate its EEZ boundary agreements
with Vietnam and Malaysia in this area.
In summary, despite its limitations, the LOSC provides a legal framework
which the Claimants could utilise if they have the political will and trust
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Existing maritime claims and EEZ claim from largest islands (with equidistance
lines) and 12-nm territorial sea arcs from rocks

 ecessary to set aside the disputes on territorial sovereignty and maritime
n
claims and begin serious negotiations on JDAs and other provisional arrangements of a practical nature in the areas of overlapping maritime claims. The
LOSC also provides a framework whereby all of the Claimants, including
China, can pursue their national interests in the South China Sea in a manner that is consistent with international law. The proposals advanced here
offer an avenue whereby China’s maritime claims can be brought into conformity with the LOSC at relatively limited cost but potentially substantial
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benefit to itself and to the other South China Sea Claimants. This would potentially provide a platform for constructive discussions on cooperation and
joint development in the areas of overlapping claims defined on the basis of
the LOSC, which would be to the benefit of all parties to the South China Sea
disputes.
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Appendix: Explanatory Note on Figures
Fig. 1 is a version of the map prepared by Clive Schofield and Andi Arsana of
the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS)
for the agora on the South China Sea in the American Journal of International
Law (AJIL), Vol. 107, No. 1, January 2013, page 96. It was based on the map issued
by the Geographer’s Office of the U.S. Department of State in January 2010, No.
803425AI(G02257) 1–10. However, the authors determined that several features
near Vanguard Bank which had 12-nm territorial sea arcs around them on the
US map were in fact submerged. Therefore, these features were not included
in the map for the AJIL. Subsequent analysis has led to the conclusion that
other features are not above high-tide features and this is reflected in the other
figures included in this article (see below).
Fig. 2 is adapted from Fig. 2.11 in Clive Schofield, ‘Defining the “Boundary”
between Land and Sea: Territorial Sea Baselines in the South China Sea’, in
S Jayakumar, Tommy Koh and Robert Beckman, eds, The South China Sea
Disputes and the Law of the Sea (Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming, UK,
2014). It illustrates that the impact of straight baseline claims is significantly
more pronounced with respect to “additional” areas of internal waters and territorial sea generated than in terms of expanding the limits of the EEZ.
Fig. 3 illustrates the effect if an EEZ were claimed from the largest islands in the
South China Sea. In drawing hypothetical EEZ claims from the islands in the
direction of the open sea in the central part of the South China Sea, the islands
were given full effect by drawing 200-nm arcs from the islands. As indicated on
the map, the result is that all of the South China Sea would be subject to EEZ
claims, except for a relatively small high seas pocket in the north-eastern part
of the South China Sea.
With respect to maritime spaces lying between the larger islands of the
South China Sea and the surrounding mainland and main island coasts, overlapping maritime claims would result as there is predominantly less than 400
nm between them. Consequently, in the direction of mainland coasts of the
States bordering the South China Sea, theoretical equidistance lines were constructed between the islands and the surrounding mainland and main island
coasts. The reason for this is that even if the islands are in principle entitled to
an EEZ of 200 nm, the maximum extent of the EEZ that could be accorded to
the islands would be that within a strict equidistance line drawn between the
islands and the mainland coast.
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The 28 islands used for this exercise are 12 islands in the Spratly Islands
group, 15 islands in the Paracel Islands group, and Pratas Island. These features
were selected based on analysis of satellite imagery and information in the
sailing directions issued by the United States and the United Kingdom and relevant literature.119 Evidence suggests that these features meet the definition
of an island in Article 121, that is, they are naturally formed areas of land surrounded by and above water at high tide. The islands that were selected are
the largest and/or are vegetated. Therefore, it can be maintained that they are
not “rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of its own
that are not entitled to an EEZ and continental shelf. Accordingly, it can be
argued that these features are capable, in principle, of generating an EEZ of
their own”.
The insular features in the Spratly Islands group used to construct theoretical equidistance lines and 200-nm arcs were as follows (from largest to smallest in estimated area): Itu Aba, Thitu Island, West York Island, Northeast Cay,
Southwest Cay, Spratly Island, Namyit Island, Nansha(n) Island, Sand Cay,
Loaita Island, Sin Cowe Island and Amboyna Cay.
The islands in the Paracel Islands group used for the same exercise were
as follows: Woody Island and Rocky Islet, Lincoln Island, Triton Island,
Pattle Island, Duncan Island, West Sand, Money Island, Robert Island, North
Island, Drummond Island, Tree Island, South Island, Middle Island, Passuh
Keah and South Sand. These features are the largest in the Paracel Islands
group and all but West Sand appear to be vegetated. Given the relatively large
size of West Sand, coupled with its connection to the reef on which Tree Island
(which is vegetated) lies, West Sand was included as a basepoint for the purposes of the present exercise.120 However, given its proximity to Tree Island,
another of the larger Paracel Islands which is also vegetated, its influence on
the theoretical equidistance line is minimal.
119

Hancox and Prescott (n 53); UKHO, Admiralty Sailing Directions China Sea Pilot (Volume 1,
8th ed., UKHO, Taunton, 2010) 75–78; Mark J. Valencia, Jon M. Van Dyke and Noel A. Ludwig,
Sharing the Resources of the South China Sea (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Boston, 1997)
226–235; UKHO, China Sea Pilot, Vol. 2 (n 103), at pp. 64–73; and United States National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Sailing Directions (ENROUTE) PUB.161, South China Sea
and the Gulf of Thailand (13th ed., National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Bethesda,
2011) 5–14.
120 The relevant British Admiralty Sailing Directions (Pilot) note that West Sand is a “sandy
cay” located near the west end of the reef on which Tree Island lies. See UKHO, China Sea
Pilot, Vol. 1 (n 119), at p. 77.
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These features are annotated on Fig. 3. Also, note that for the purposes of this
exercise, normal baselines were applied not only for the islands themselves,
but also with respect to the surrounding mainland and main island coastlines.
Fig. 4 illustrates full, half and one-quarter weighting or effect accorded to the
larger islands in the Spratly and Paracel Island groups identified in Fig. 3.
Figs. 5, 6 and 7 are larger-scale maps detailing maritime claims, including EEZ
claims from larger islands, in the north-western, north-eastern and southern
parts of the South China Sea. These maps, together with Figs. 8 and 9, illustrate the location of the larger islands of the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands
groups used for the construction of theoretical equidistance lines by showing
shaded territorial sea areas around them. Unshaded 12-nm arcs are shown with
respect to smaller features which may meet the definition of an island under
the LOSC, but which in our view are too small and barren to be inhabitable
and entitled to an EEZ of their own (see below). Unshaded 12-nm territorial sea
limits are also shown around mainland and main island coasts.
Fig. 8 shows the hypothetical EEZ claims from the islands and the equidistance lines. As noted above, the islands used to generate the EEZ claims are
shown with shaded 12-nm territorial sea circles around them, and unshaded
12-nm territorial sea arcs are shown around other features which may meet
the definition of an island under the LOSC, but which were not used to claim
an EEZ because they are too small and barren to be inhabitable and entitled
to an EEZ of their own. The number of features in the latter category is very
uncertain because past studies and past maps are not consistent. Although
the 2010 US State Department map has 12-nm territorial sea arcs around more
than 50 other features in the Spratly Islands, our analysis of the previous studies and sailing directions indicates that 34 of those features are either clearly
below water at high tide or the sources are inconsistent as to whether they are
above water at high tide. Consequently, we have adopted a consciously conservative approach and exercised prudence and caution, drawing 12-nm arcs
only around the 16 small features (in addition to the 12 larger islands identified
above) in the Spratly Islands, which the previous studies consistently refer to
as being above water at high tide. For similar reasons, we have drawn 12-nm
arcs around Scarborough Shoal as there is consistent evidence that 4–6 small
rocks on the reef are above water at high tide.
The features which we identified as rocks entitled to a 12-nm territorial sea
of their own include Scarborough Shoal, as well as the following 16 features in
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the Spratly Islands: Loaita Cay, Lankiam Cay, Sandy Cay, Collins Reef, Len Dao,
Barque Canada Reef, Commodore Reef, Louisa Reef, Mariveles Reef, Pearson
Reef, Royal Charlotte Reef, Swallow Reef, Central Reef, Cuarteron Reef, East
Reef and West Reef. The following features in the Paracel Islands also meet this
definition: Antelope Reef, Bombay Reef, Discovery Reef, Middle Sand, North
Sand, Observation Bank, Pyramid Rock, Quanfu Dao and Vuladdore Reef.
These territorial sea limits associated with these features are shown on Fig. 8
and all features mentioned above are annotated on Fig. 9 below. In light of
the complex tidal regime of the South China Sea, coupled with uncertainties

figure 9

Annotated map of South China Sea Islands
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and inconsistencies with respect to hydrographic surveying in the region, it
is acknowledged that a number of additional very small features may exist in
the Paracel and Spratly Islands which are, in fact, above the high water. Such
features can most plausibly be categorised as ‘rocks’ within the meaning of
Article 121(3) of the LOSC and therefore would be capable of generating 12-nm
territorial sea limits.121 However, even if such additional insular features do
exist in the South China Sea, it is the authors’ view that they would not qualify
as islands capable of generating EEZ and continental shelf rights and therefore
would not have a meaningful impact on the central arguments advanced in
this article.
Fig. 8 also shows the nine-dashed line that is indicated on Chinese maps of
the South China Sea. The dashes on the Chinese map are indicated in bold and
are also connected by interpolated lines to illustrate what China’s claim is if it
claims rights and jurisdiction over all of the maritime space inside the ninedashed line.122 It should be noted that there is inherent uncertainty related
to both the location of the nine-dashed line and the interpolated intervening lines shown “joining” the nine dashes up. No official coordinates of the
dashed line have been published. The dashed line segments illustrated were
extracted from a map attached in the Chinese note to the Secretary-General of
the United Nations in its response to Malaysia-Vietnam’s extended continental
shelf submission and the intervening lines interpolated between them. This
map therefore allows one to visualise the difference between the area inside
the nine-dashed line and the area of overlapping claims that would result if an
EEZ claim were made from the largest islands in the South China Sea.
121

122

In this context it is worth noting that, based on its past jurisprudence, the ICJ indicated
in clear terms in 2012 that even the smallest island generates a 12-nm territorial sea. See
Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia) (n 57), at para. 37.
Communications Received with regard to the Joint Submission made by Malaysia and
Viet Nam (n 22), China (7 May 2009).
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